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MACROECONOMIC AND POLITICAL
INSTABILITIES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
James Gaius The, Morris College and University ofSouth Carolina
ABSTRACT
The analysis uses macroeconomic models designed to capture the direct
impact of political instability on macroeconomic stability, and the effect of
macroeconomic instability on political stability. The model is an adaptation of
the neo-classical production function with fixed-effects formulated to explore
the postulated interdependencies in key sub-Saharan countries over the
period 1960-1990. The estimates indicate that macroeconomic instability
indices as well as unemployment and inflation are positive and significantly
correlated with the political instability variable. Also, there is a significant
negative relationship between political instability and the nations economic
output as measured by the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Furthermore,
there is a significant positive relationship between income inequality and
political instability and the marginal propensity to political violence differs
across socioeconomic groups and is highest for the lowest income group.
Thus, effective strategic policy responses must take into account the reasons
why people turn to violent political interest articulation and aggregation
including violent disintegrative nationalism. Indeed, the analysis suggests
that both political and economic reforms are necessary to stabilize the
political economy ofsub-Saharan Africa.
INTRODUCTION
Macroeconomic and political instabilities seem to have formed a VICIOUS
circle in sub-Saharan Africa. Political instability inhibits macroeconomic
stability and macroeconomic instability engenders political instability. Polities
are poor because they are politically· unstable and very unstable because
they are poorer. While current scholarship accepts this relationship as
self-evident, the postulated vicious circle and the macroeconomic consequences
of political instability in sub-Saharan Africa have received limited attention
within a systematic empirical framework. Some level of political instability
and thus the potential for violent political dissent exists in all societies at all
times. But what is the direct relationship between political instability and
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key macroeconomic indicators? Does the widening gap between the few
rich and the many poor foment political instability? Why have IMF-styled
macroeconomic policies largely been resisted or rejected in most sub-Saharan
Africa? The answer to these questions have direct bearing on the ongoing
debates over what must be done to alleviate continuing macroeconomic insta-
bility: High inflation, high unemployment and poor economic performance
amidst escalating political violence in sub-Saharan Africa. The overriding
purpose of this analysis is to suggest some answers to these questions.
Dominant among the underlying causes of macroeconomic instability is
a political factor: Governmental instability (including frequent violent regime
changes). Political systems have not developed sufficiently to accommodate
orderly transition from one administration to another. Rulers hold on indefinitely
or they are toppled through military coups (Fosu, 1992; The, 1989). From an
administrative policy viewpoint, strategic planning is not politically feasible.
Indeed, politics seems to have frustrated most attempts at economic reform.
Also, economic crises tend to create political crises (Anunobi & Ukong, 2000).
Furthermore, social conflict is so much a part of the African political processes
and to treat political violence as an aberration places one in the awkward position
of insisting that all significant political events in the past four decades are mere
deviations (Ewoh, 2000; Fosu, 1992; The, 1989; Bwy, 1968). Unless serious
attempt is made to disentangle the vicious circle of interdependencies, little will
be possible to change sub-Saharan Africa's development prospects.
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
From the general literature on political violence and economic performance two
dominant but divergent views emerge, namely: the "downswing paradigm" and
the "upswing paradigm." The downswing proponents contend that political
violence increases as economic performance decreases (Cutright, 1963). They
argue, at least implicitly, that wealthy nations are stable nations.
The upswing theorists argue that violence is most likely to occur when
periods of prolonged rising expectations and rising gratification is followed by
a short period of sharp reversal, during which the gap between what is expected
and what is obtained widens and becomes intolerable. The frustration that
develops, when it is intense and widespread in the society, results in violent
political action (Ibe, 1989; Davies, 1962, 1970). In the J-curve hypothesis,
Davies (1962) cont~nds that whether they are farmers facing falling prices for
their produce, or factory workers who lose their jobs, or students who graduate
from university with high honors and find themselves without jobs, such
individuals see a widening gap between their rising expectations and their down
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turning gratification. The J-curve hypothesis postulates that this rapidly
widening gap portends political violence.
The theoretical relationship between political and macroeconomic
instabilities is very well established (Fosu, 1992; Ibe, 1989; Gupta, 1987;
Parvin, 1973). In sum, political instability instability of political structures,
governments, public institutions including frequent and violent regime
changes is hypothesized to exert substantial adverse effects on the principal
components of a nations gross domestic product (GDP). The most common
sources of political instability in sub-Saharan Africa are military coups detat,
strikes which result often in violent ciyil disobedienceincluding substantial loss
of lives and property, disintegrative nationalism and civil wars. In such
environment, public and private institutions cannot function efficiently and
effectively.
Indeed, political instability is likely to reduce the quantity and quality of
human capital in these nations. Those citizens with substantial human capital
investment are frequently the target ofcoup leaders: They are forced to cooperate
and remain silent or they are imprisoned, executed or exiled. Further, because
of the magnitude of uncertainty, businesses are likely to delay or avoid
long term and substantial capital investments. Political risks emanating from a
nations unstable political environment are likely to increase the cost of capital
and render it unattractive for foreign as well as domestic investment. Frequent
rule changes are likely to exert adverse effects on both public and private
investments as strategic planning becomes extremely difficult and ineffective.
And, because those in power cannot be assured of a peaceful transition, most
frequently engage in rent seeking or loot the public treasury, hiding their ill
gotten gains in foreign accounts to finance their future lives in exile (The, 1989;
Gupta, 1987). Theoretically, political instability is likely to distort and adversely
affect current and future allocation of scarce productive resources and the
returns to factors of production. These distortions are likely to have severe
adverse consequences for macroeconomic stability in sub-Saharan Africa.
Controversy has arisen over the relationship between political violence
and income inequality. As Midlarsky (1988) points out, there is a typical
finding of a weak, barely significant relationship between income
inequality and political violence. However, there have been instances of
significant relationship existing between the two as reported in other studies
(e.g., The, 1989; Muller, 1985; Parvin, 1973).
A later investigation, Ibe (1989) was an attempt to improve upon
previous studies by exploring the neglected aspects of the interdependencies
between political violence and economic wellbeing. The study addressed the
simultaneity and feedback effects by using a methodology that analyzed
the postulated vicious circle both over time and across countries within
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a multivariate model. The current study focuses the scope of inquiry and
contributes to an increased understanding of the direct adverse relationship
between macroeconomic and political instabilities in sub-Saharan Africa.
ANALYTICAL MODEL
The models were estimated using the ordinary least squares (OLS) method. The
principal model is an adaptation of the neo-classical production function with
the estimated equation of the form:
Y= f(K, L, V) (1)
where y, k, l, are growth rates of output, capital, labor respectively, and v-the
political violence variable is a measure of political instability. The ordinary least
squares (OLS) regression coefficients are elasticities; the regression coefficient
for V measures the direct and independent impact of political instability when
the impacts ofcapital, and labor are held constant and the stochastic perturbation
term is assumed to be independently and identically distributed.
To determine the factors thatinfluence political instability, the following
model is estimated:
V =fcPCY, UNEM, INFL, INEQ, SOM, HIG, LIG) (2)
where v, pcy, unem, infl, ineq, som, hig, fig are growth rates of political
instability, per capita income, unemployment, inflation, income inequality,
social mobility, high income group, low income group, respectively. The annual
growth rates of all variables are obtained by first differencing the logarithms of
the variables for successive years. Lower case letters denote the annual growth
rates of the relevant variables for country i in year t. The ordinary least squares
(OLS) regression coefficients are elasticities with respect to the exogenous
variables.
Economic output (Y) as defined operationally, is measured by changes
in gross domestic product (GDP), the market value of total output of goods and
services produced in the economy within a year. Political instability (V) is
measured by the number of deaths per thousand from politically relevant
violence, either from a populace against a government and/or from a government
or its functionaries against a populace. The instability variable unlike the various
category and scaled variables (see Fosu, 1992) directly and unambiguously
captures the immediate end-product of riots, coups, political assassinations,
violent disintegrative nationalism, civil wars, guerrilla wars and rebellions (Ibe,
1989; Midlarsky, 1988; Parvin, 1973).
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Interval or ratio measurements are preferred for the level of statistical
analyses performed in this study. Nominal variables are simply inappropriate
unless certain classifications are to be treated as dummy variables. The use of
other indicators of political instability was contemplated but instances of politi-
cal violence could not be empirically defined so as to yield mutually exclusive
events for analysis. The scaling method is extremely subjective, arbitrary and
difficult to both replicate and verify. The main problem with and objections to
the various scaled indicators have to do with counting as discrete and equal
events, which differ in magnitude and scope (Fosu, 1992; The, 1989).
The main hypotheses embodied in the models are the following:
I) A negative relationship exists between political instability and per
capita income.
2) A positive relationship exists between political instability and inequality
in income distribution as measured by the Gini index.
3) A positive relationship exists between political instability and
macroeconomic instability as measured by unemployment rate and
inflation rate, respectively.
4) The marginal propensity to political violence differs across
socioeconomic groups.
These research hypotheses are simple and need no additional
explanation. However, some scholarship in this field contends that the
effect of income inequality is" region-specific. In fact, because of diverse
historical and cultural values, different world regions could have different
empirical expressions of inequality, which eventually yield political instability.
Theoretically, it is possible that the absolute distribution of wealth (poverty)
rather than relative distribution (inequality in distribution of income) is more
germane in predicting violent mass political dissent (Ibe, 1989; Midlarsky,
1988).
The use of literacy rate as a measure of socioeconomic mobility
deserves a few comments. In most societies, from an individual's point
of view, the educational level attained determines to a large extent the
socioeconomic status of that individual. Therefore, to the extent that the
educational means and opportunities are available to the members of the
society for their personal socioeconomic emancipation, socioeconomic
mobility is significantly enhanced (Ibe, 1989; Parvin, 1973).
The expected relationship between literacy rates and political instability
can be either positive or negative. Hope makes a rather intolerable condition
bearable. Education gives such hope but it can also raise expectations
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unreasonably. Indiscreet dissemination of information can be destabilizing,.as
much as information can be used to rationalize violent political expression.
Furthermore, education can and does become a very powerful tool ofsocial and
political indoctrination and propaganda and, therefore may depress manifest
political violence rather than exacerbate it (Ibe, 1989; Parvin, 1973). Education
is a multi-faceted variable and may yield a diverse empirical expression with
respect to political instability. As a proxy for human capital, the benefits are
likely to outweigh the cost. However, if educational opportunities are available
only to the privileged few, as is often the case, it can create and maintain
income inequality and thus exacerbate rather than attenuate the level of
political instability.
Finally, as some have noted, when educational attainment does not
lead to meaningful employment, it tends to foment violent political interest
articulation and aggregation. With a high rate of unemployment among
university graduates and other professionals in most sub-Saharan Africa, it is
reasonable to expect that education exacerbate rather than attenuate violent
political articulation. These tendencies are neither peculiar to sub-Saharan
Africa nor confined there.
An important feature of this analysis is the use of a model with
fixed-effects. The model makes use of large number of degrees of freedom
provided by a pooled time-series cross-sectional data to control for otherwise
unmeasured country-specific and period (year-speCific) effects (Guseh, 1997;
The, 1989). The overriding objective in using the fixed-effects correction
technique is to derive estimates free from selection bias. The fixed-effects
estimators are not contaminated with spurious effects of any stable, unmeasured
country characteristics. Such characteristics include unmeasured human capital,
geographical locational disadvantages as in the case of land-locked
countries, religious differences and their influence on economic performance
and propensity to political violence, domophobia which is the fear of
domestically made goods, and unmeasured natural endowments which
differentially affect economic performance and the general level of well being
across the sample. As Guseh (1997) notes, the fixed-effects modeling is
particularly desirable in this type of analysis because of the differing
impacts of various political and economic systems on economic growth
across the sample under study (pourgerami, 1988; Scully, 1988).
The fixed-effects modeling is accomplished in this study through
the use of country dummies and time dummies (with appropriate omitted
categories) included in each equation in the model. This essentially holds
unmeasured country-specific and period-specific effects constant. The unique
effect is the systematic but unmeasured characteristics of each country
which is the "fixed-effect" from which the technique takes its name.
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Removing the "fixed effect" is particularly useful for the test of whether
political instability increases as macroeconomic stability decreases because it
assures us that all relevant systematic but unmeasured macroeconomic output
and political instability country differences have been controlled. The technique
also permits more accurate estimates of the interdependencies than is possible
in the cross-sectional analysis comprising much of the literature (Guseh, 1997;
Ibe, 1989).
It 'is important to note that while countries are units of observation, the
political and economic systems are not. Theoretically, two countries with
identical economic statistics but completely different political systems or
economic system for that matter, would look identical and influence the results
equivalently. The fixed-effects modeling holds such unmeasured disparities
constant and thus guides against drawing manifestly unwarranted conclusions
from the regression estimates that could result otherwise. It is rather obvious
that different political systems are likely to produce and tolerate differing levels
of political instability (Ibe, 1989; Parvin, 1973).
SAMPLE AND DATA SOURCES
The sample chosen for the study includes a broad spectrum of the countries
which, as of 1960, were recognized national units. Although a great majority of
these countries had attained independence by 1960 or thereabout, political
independence was not used as an inclusion criterion. The date 1960 was
chosen to capture the effects of what most African scholars believe to represent
the epoch of political upheaval in sub-Saharan Africa: the Congo crises.
Specifically, the study focuses on changes in political instability and
macroeconomic performance that occurred during the period 1960-1990.
The sample reflects the diverse colonial and historical background of
sub-Saharan Africa. The diversity of the countries included in the sample
is such that an estimated probability of self-selection into the sample would
be statistically insignificant. Heckman's correction for selectivity was thus
contemplated but was deemed unnecessary, given the diversity. There were two
major exclusion criteria. First, the existence of reliable comparable time-series
data over the period under study was the primary criterion. Lack of reliable
comparable data was a major reason some potential sample countries were
dropped. The unavailability of macro-level data, was a binding constraint on the
breadth of the empirical exploration of the postulated interdependencies. A
major portion of the time spent on this study was devoted to data verification
and transformation. Data were not simply available in the format amenable to
immediate analysis.
70
7
Ibe: Macroeconomic and Political Instabilities in Sub-Saharan Africa
Published by DigitalCommons@Kennesaw State University, 2002
Macroeconomic and Political Instabilities in Sub-Saharan Africa
Second, it was required that significant portion of manifest political
instability within the countries to be included in the sample emanate from
internal forces. In order to properly establish the relationship between political
instability and macroeconomic stability, it is crucial that known incidence of
political instability be attributable to internal factors. Mozambique was dropped
from the sample a priori because it failed to meet this criterion. The protracted
political crisis in Mozambique has been attributed to the activities of
mercenaries, allegedly recruited and funded by the former regime in South
Africa. These anonymous vandals had neither political recognition nor known
political agenda or objectives. Such irrational vandalism within Mozambique
made the country rather an obvious outlier. South Africa was excluded a priori
because of its former policy of apartheid. Further, its deliberate apartheid
policy bred political instability, which may not be attributable to
macroeconomic or non-random social factors. South Africa was excluded
because industrial conflicts could not be decoupled from political conflicts and
to some extent criminal violence is treated as political violence. It is important
to note that while industrial conflicts are no longer identical with political
conflicts in most countries, this certainly is not the case in all totalitarian
political systems including former apartheid South Africa.
The sample consists of 32 sub-Saharan African nations obtained
through the predetermined set of exclusion criteria outlined above. It should be
noted that while great effort was made to ensure that the sample reflects most
of the sub-Saharan countries both in terms of political and economic systems,
the fixed-effects model is quite robust against selection bias. The country
dummies hold factors that are unique to the individual countries constant,
thus eliminating bias due to cross-sectional invariant factors. The time dummies
hold period-specific factors constant thus eliminating bias due time invariant
factors. See the Appendix for a list of the sample.
The data used in this study were made available by the Inter-University
Consortium for Political and Social Research. Data for some countries were
originally collected by the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the .
Census. The macroeconomic data were from various World Bank Reports.
Neither the collector of the original data nor the Consortium bears any
responsibility for the analysis or interpretations presented here.
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TABLE 1
OLS Results: Macroeconomic and Political Instabilities
in sub-Saharan Africa a
Exogenous
Variabl~s
Regression
Coefficient
Standard
Errors
T-Values
Constant
Capital (k)
Labor (I)
Political Instability (v)
F= 19.28
Adjusted R2=0.78
DW= -1.07
N=32
11.76
1.55
1.86
-1.97
0.82
1.09
0.66
1.89***
1.71 ***
2.98*
a Nigeria is the omitted category; the country and time effects are not
shown and are available upon request from the author.
*pOl, two-tailed test
**p05, two-tailed test
***plO, two-tailed test
SUMMARY OF THE RESEARCH FINDINGS
The principal findings of this analysis are shown in Table 1 and 2, and
summarized as follows:
1. Macroeconomic instability indices: Unemployment and inflation rates
are positive and significantly correlated with the political instability
variable. A percentage increase in inflation rate results in 1.27 percent
increase in political instability, and one percent increase in unemploy-
ment rate results in 1.03 percent increase in political instability.
2. There is a significant negative relationship between political instability
and the nations economic output as measured by the gross domestic
product (GDP). A percentage increase in political instability results in 1.
97 percent decrease in GDP growth rate.
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3. Consistent with theoretical expectation, there is a significant
positive relationship between political instability and income inequality.
A percentage increase in income inequality results in 1.36 increase in
political instability. This is not entirely unexpected because in most
sub-Saharan Africa public employees including university professors and
other professionals go without pay for several months which often results
in strikes, violent civil disobedience, destruction of property and loss of
lives.
4. The marginal propensity to political violence is different across
socioeconomic groups, with the lowest income group exhibiting the
highest propensity to political violence. The low-income group variable
is positive and significantly cOlTelated with political instability.
The analytical models that are consistent with neoclassical theory,
modified and specified to capture the political instability variable show
significant levels of validity and good fit. The Durbin Watson statistic
provides no fvidence of auto-correlation. See tables 1 and 2 for the
F-statistic, Rand DW statistic for the estimated equations.
TABLE 2
OLS Results of the Political Instability Model
for sub-Saharan Africa
Exogenous
Variables
Regression
Coefficient
Standard
Errors
T-Values
Constant
Per capita income (pcy)
Unemployment (unem)
Inflation (infl)
Income inequality (ineq)
Social Mobility (sam)
High Income (hig)
Low Income (fig)
F= 18.76
Adjusted R2 = 0.73
DW= -1.02
N=32
19.72
-1.45
1.03
1.27
1.36
1.64
-1.78
2.07
0.81
0.60
0.76
0.80
1.29
1.69
1.05
1.79***
1.72***
1.67***
1.70***
1.27
1.05
1.97**
b Nigeria is the omitted category; country and time effects are not shown.
*pOl, two-tailed test
**p05, two-tailed test
***plO, two-tailed test
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CONCLUSION
This analysis has examined the relationship between macroeconomic and
political instabilities in key sub-Saharan African nations. In exploring these
complex interrelationships, the study focused on the direct relationship between
macroeconomic instability and political instability. The empirical results tend
to support the notion that political instability inhibits macroeconomic stability
while macroeconomic instability promotes political instability. With analytical
models that captured the direct adverse effects of political instability on
economic output, the study seems to suggest that political instability not only
has direct significant negative macroeconomic effects, but it also induces
macroeconomic instability via its several political and social consequences.
The results further established that a rather robust positive relationship exists
between political instability and income inequality, namely: Political instability
increases as income inequality increases. This result confirms some suspicion
that those who benefit from the political chaos should in fact work for a stable
political economy to protect their vested interests and ill gotten gains. Indeed,
those who own property do not destroy property. It is well established that the
middle class is a stabilizing force in all political economies (The, 1989;
Midlarsky, 1988; Gupta, 1987).
Finally, the findings show that the marginal propensity to political
violence differs across socioeconomic groups and it is greatest for the lowest
income group. These results have profound implications for sub-Saharan Africa.
Thus, unless something is done to disentangle the vicious circle, nothing can be
done to improve the prospects for macroeconomic stability in these nations. The
results suggest that concrete economic conditions must be improved to break
the vicious circle. More importantly, the findings of this study suggest that
political administration can target specific socioeconomic groups to ameliorate
political instability as a short run measure. While stable and growing private
economy presents the best hope for all socioeconomic groups, progressive
public policies such as earned income credit, low income housing, mortgage
loan guarantees, small business loans, Medicare, Medicaid, social security and
job programs have produced sizable and viable middle class in stable nations.
International Monetary Fund-styled solutions and conditionality tend to neglect
the high political costs that make such policies unattractive and unworkable in
unstable political economy of most sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, effective
strategic policy responses must take into account the reasons why people
turn to violent political articulation and aggregation including violent
disintegrative nationalism. Indeed, this analysis concludes that political and
economic reforms are required to stabilize the political economy ofsub-Saharan
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Africa. Public and private institutions must indicate more accountability and
transparency to minimize incidence of corruption, another damaging social
consequence of political instability.
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APPENDIX
The following countries make up the final sample:
Angola
Benin
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cameroon
Central African Republic
Chad
Congo
Cote dIvoire
Ethiopia
Gabon
Gambia
Ghana
Guinea
Xenya
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritania
Niger
76
Nigeria
Rwanda
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Sudan
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zaire
Zambia
Zimbabwe
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